Quickie note: I was invited to give a version of my TIDAL WAVE/Ploesti 1 August 1943 presentation on the CAF (Commemorative Air Force–formerly Confederate Air Force) podcast on 3 August 2022. The Youtube and Facebook links that will allow you to watch the recordings are below.
The title is “Dragged Through The Mouth of Hell – Correcting The Record on Ploesti, 1 August 1943.”
My presentation tells the true story in words and pictures of what really happened on that famous attack: background, preparation, execution, and aftermath. Obviously every detail cannot be covered in about an hour, but I believe this “bird’s eye view” presentation will allow you to come away with a much clearer and more accurate understanding of the mission.
The links are:
Youtube: https://youtu.be/KYYFLijFmIQ
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/CommemorativeAF
My understanding is the presentation will remain available in both places. Remember, you can always post your questions and comments here on this website.
Dave
DAVID H. KLAUS
www.Low-Level-Ploesti.org
www.FineArtOfDecals.com
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Dear Mr. Klaus,
looking forward to tonight’s presentation, as well as your book on the 1 August 1943 mission. However, do you have any interest in a similar treatment (book[let], decal pack) of the earlier HALPRO detachment and mission?
Hi Phillip
Hope you were able to watch my presentation and that it was worth your time.
Although HALPRO is outside the scope of my TIDAL WAVE project, I did mention the mission in my presentation and will provide some additional information in my book. You’ll note that all HALPRO did, in effect, was scatter bombs across the Romanian countryside. The few bombs that fell in the Ploesti area caused literally NO damage. And, as I state in my presentation, HALPRO did NOT cause the Axis to increase Ploesti’s defenses, which were planned long before HALPRO left the US.
Neither Halverson nor any of his officers were ever asked to write an after-action report, and none of did in fact write an official report. On the other hand, the British Royal Air Force, which provided literally all the support for the HALPRO mission except flying the planes wrote an extensive report on the mission, and it was NOT complimentary. In fact, it damned Halverson and his officers using about every word in the dictionary and many that weren’t. The ill will created by HALPRO left a lasting effect on USAAF-RAF relations in the Middle East for many months; rescued only by later American commanders and officers with better and more practical attitudes.
I provided this RAF report to the 376th Bomb Group association historian and he may write an expansive article on the mission; I’ll hit only the highlights in my book.
Regarding the original HALPRO ships, all were early B-24D-CO models with the twin fixed .50 guns mounted under the nose floorboards. One of the originals that flew the first Ploesti mission also participated in TIDAL WAVE: #9 Lorraine/Queen Bee. Another of the original HALPRO ships, #24 Wash’s Tub, participated in TIDAL WAVE but did not participate in the first HALPRO attack on 12 Jun 42 since it had not left the US at the time of the first attack. This ship survived long enough to get sent back to the States on War Bond Tour.
At least one other original HALPRO ship, Florine Ju-Ju (later Teggie Ann, and still later The Blue Streak) was present in the desert at the time of TIDAL WAVE but did not fly the mission, probably due to some mechanical issue that could not be repaired in time. It’s not clear why the Revell company chose The Blue Streak markings for their 1960s model kit of the “TIDAL WAVE B-24D” since she did not actually participate in the mission. This ship was repaired after TIDAL WAVE and continued to fly combat missions even after the 376th Bomb Group moved to Italy, and survived long enough to be sent back to the States on a War Bond Tour.
Dave
David,
I was completely enthralled with your CAF, Tidal Wave presentation, even though as you admit it’s only the highlights of the highlights. I was shocked by the revelation of the destruction of the motion picture films. Such priceless images, such a treacherous thing to have done for literally no gain.
The August 1, 1943 Ploesti mission has held a deep fascination for me since the autumn of 1964 when as a bright 4th grader, my then brand new school library had bought the American Heritage Junior Library, among them was “Air War Against Hitler’s Germany” which became the genesis of my interest in Tidal Wave since it contained a chapter on the famous mission. That Christmas my dear father gave me the then brand new Revell B-24D “The Blue Streak” model kit. It was built and proudly displayed in just a few days. It brought much joy. Your post on HALPRO certainly brought back some good memories. Having all of your 1/72 scale Ploesti and B-24 decal sheets one of those will find its way onto a vintage Revell B-24D.
I look forward to both of your works on Tidal Wave with much anticipation! It’s been a long journey since 1964.
Regards,
William
Hi William
Thanks for your very kind comments!
Agree, that “silver reclamation” project was literally insane. They destroyed not only all the original TIDAL WAVE film stock, they destroyed footage that went back to the 1890s, including scenes of American Indians, early 20th Century life in the US and around the world, and countless other irrecoverable scenes that would be of invaluable help to modern historians. Government bureaucrats doing what they do best…
I had a similar early life experience to you, except my initial exposure was to the Dugan & Stewart Ploesti book, published in 1962 but read in 1963 when I was 10 years old. I can distinctly recall that I thought even then it was idiotic that a young lieutenant was leading the entire TIDAL WAVE mission. As we now know, Brian Flavelle was an experienced and highly qualified pilot who was a section leader in the 376th on the mission, but NOT the mission leader.
I too built the Revell Blue Streak model and thought, as did many thousands of other young (and not so young) modelers, she was one of the Ploesti attackers as shown in the boxtop artwork.
The Blue Streak was an interesting ship. She was a B-24D-CO 41-11613, one of the original complement of HALPRO, named Florene Ju Ju at the time. As an early D-CO, she had the factory-installed twin FIXED .50 guns mounted underneath the nose flooring, similar to Kane’s Hail Columbia, Wongo Wongo, and Hadley’s Harem (although these last three received this gun mod at the Gura mod center in Eritrea after arrival in Africa). Although present and serviceable at HALPRO’s base, she did not fly the first HALPRO mission to attack Ploesti. I cannot document why.
After HALPRO was incorporated into the 376th Bomb Group, a KK Compton renamed her Teggie Ann when he took command of the 376th.
When, some weeks before TIDAL WAVE, Compton took over a nearly brand-new B-24D-85-CO, 42-40664, he named the new ship Teggie Ann and then at some point a different crew renamed 613 The Blue Streak. While (again) present at the 376th base at the time of TIDAL WAVE, for some reason she did not fly the mission. I don’t have documentation, but would expect it was because she was either considered too old to make the 2400 mile round trip, or was out of commission for maintenance reasons.
But, in fact, The Blue Streak airframe completed 110 combat missions and survived to return to the States on a War Bond Tour. One thing I notice in photos of The Blue Streak taken after the 376th moved to their new base in Italy is that the twin fixed .50 nose guns had been removed and the holes in the nose greenhouse faired over.
(Sorry about the long side-track, but I’ve always thought The Blue Streak was a cool ship. I lost some interest when I learned many decades ago that she was not a TIDAL WAVE veteran, but a real trouper nonetheless and still a cool ship.)
Now back to work on the book (when all the daily life c*r*a*p doesn’t interfere…).
Dave
I enjoyed your presentation last night. Thank you!
Thanks for your kind comments! I hope it was worth your time.
Dave
For author David H. Klaus: I caught the replay of this great presentation on Ploesti. the TIDAL WAVE mission brushes up and certainly loomed over my own research on the 376th. My subject is a co-pilot and later a first pilot from near my hometown who arrived with his crew a bit after the TIDAL WAVE mission, and so they interacted with some of the pilots and crew who were by then finishing up their tours.
I do mention the 376th, the 98th, and the 93rd in my study, not so much the other two. I mention the 98th because they were wing-mates with the 376th, and I mention the 93rd only because they followed the Liberandos over the cloud cover, didn’t lag behind, and I presumed a previous intrinsic understanding between their leadership and Compton’s, because Compton had come from the 93rd and had been close to Timberlake. Your revelations on Ent were fairly eye-opening to say the least. I think there were good reasons why Killer Kane was nursing his engines, and I think he got a pretty raw deal in the blame laying afterwards. So, evidently, thought Robert Sternfels on “Sandman”, as he later wrote about. Compton, on the other hand, was confident in his prior use of the B-24s for high-speed, low level missions against targets in Sicily and other parts of the Med, including against shipping. Their attitude was, as you imply, pretty cavalier about the whole thing. Ent had little or no yoke time in the Lib but had apparently accompanied Compton on at least one or two missions prior to Tidal Wave.
Again, all of this is tangential to my own scope and focus, but your perspective shed new light because of the difference in angle.
Regards, Joe H. Camp, Jr., PhD, author of LANGDON LIBERANDO (just released 27 July 2022).
[you might dig this, and it might reinforce some notions you seemed to have about the 376th]
Hi Joe
First, thanks for your kind comments about my presentation.
Also: I just ordered your book, which I’ll consume with alacrity!
You mention Compton’s friendship with Timberlake. Yes, he was friends with Ted Timberlake, commander of the 93rd from the time it was formed until May 43, when Ted was pulled up to command the 201st. It was on Ted’s recommendation to his brother, BG Pat Timberlake (who at the time was either 9th AF Chief of Staff or IX Bomber Command commander (don’t have the changeover date at my fingertips right now)), that KK was selected as the new 376th commander over all other AC officers in Theater.
As noted in my presentation, the column of groups formation (376/93/98/44/389) was pulled apart when Kane of the 98th flew on lower power settings than briefed. This forced the 98th, 44th, and 389th to fall behind since neither the 44th nor 389th commanders were willing to break formation to pass the 98th and catch up with the two leading groups.
This separation was entirely Kane’s fault since he refused the order to supply a fully loaded B-24 and crew for the mission fuel consumption test flown by ships from the other four groups on 21 Jul 43. This flight simulated the full mission profile, with planned bomb loads, distance flown, altitudes at the specific checkpoints, etc., matching the profile to be followed on the actual mission.
High-time (old) airframes from the 44th, 93rd, and 376th (all 389th ships were brand-new) clearly proved that when the briefed power settings were followed, ships would land with a fuel safety margin of at least an hour’s extra flying time still in the tanks.
Refusing to participate in this test gave Kane, in his mind at least, permission to fly at whatever power settings suited his mood. This was entirely consistent behavior for him; many other examples exist.
As also well documented, Kane had a personality where people either loved or hated him. Obviously Sternfels fell into the “loved him” category.
Also in the “formation separation” category is the weather front penetration over Yugoslavia. This was an overall command failure and not merely Kane’s fault (although had he been where he was supposed to be the front penetration would not have been an issue). Ent failed to ensure solutions to several critical issues were specified prior to takeoff (formation integrity; weather front penetration; bomb bay fuel usage; air-to-air communications procedures under radio silence; etc.).
Again, I’m eagerly awaiting your book’s arrival here on Monday! I’m sure your research will fill in some of the gaps in my own.
Dave
I’ve listened to your CAF presentation several times and will be interested in your book when it comes out. I’ve had a lot of questions about the mission for several years and disagree with a lot of what’s been said in the past. You have been saying at least a few of the things that I’ve said. I was very interested to hear you say there was no flak train; Bob Sternfels believed that the Germans knew the plan and the train was evidence of that. Also wondering: will your book say much about Captain James A, Gunn, killed in action that day? He’s been of particular interest to me ever since I read the Dugan and Stewart book circa winter 1966. In recent years I’ve found out more about him but for a long time so much of the info was mistaken. At least for 20 years I’ve been certain of the plane he flew.
Hi Chris
German and Romanian documentation makes crystal clear there was no Flak train on the tracks between Ploesti and Floresti. As I stated in the CAF podcast/video, the documentation is clear there were only two Flak trains present in Romania during this period, and as of 31 Jul 43 (the day before the attack) both were in Constanta on the Black Sea coast. The Germans used several different types of Flak cars on trains, and close examination of numerous strike photos make it clear the train had only boxcars and no dedicated Flak cars.
It’s certainly possible–even probable–the train had one or more light machine guns for protection from partisans, but whether these were manned during the 44th/98th flyby is questionable. This is particularly true since the official German and Romanian ammunition expenditure reports state only a couple thousand rounds of 7.92 ammunition were fired, and all were listed as coming from “carbines” (rifles). One MG 34 or MG 42 (the two main German rifle-caliber machine guns) could fire a couple thousand rounds in 1.5 to 2 MINUTES, so the ammo expenditure does not suggest many if any machine guns were actually fired at the B-24s.
With all due respect to Col Sternfels, it’s absolutely certain the Axis did not know TIDAL WAVE was coming. I’ve been through the German and Romanian documentation in detail, and there’s ZERO suggestion they knew the attack was coming in advance, except in the obvious and general sense that Ploesti was a critical war target and would be attacked at some point. This lack of foreknowledge is confirmed by the absence of all the major German commanders (Gerstenberg, the Jafü, and the Flakfü) on the day of the attack. NO commander would visit a spa on a day they knew a major attack was coming.
I hadn’t considered Gunn for inclusion in my book. Please contact me separately at support@Low-Level-Ploesti.org with more information about your suggestion.
Dave
This said, the Ploesti defenders certainly had several hours advance notice the TW formation was on the way. What they knew, and when, is a somewhat complex subject and I’ll cover it in detail in my book based on Romanian air defense reporting. Although the Flak and fighters at Ploesti, both German and Romanian, were under German operational control, early warning system segments came from either German or Romanian sources, which clearly confused the defense commanders. Again, none of the senior commanders were present, so their deputies or stand-ins handled defense control–but it’s likely the real commanders would have fared any better given the quality of early warning information supplied to the defense headquarters.
I’m also wondering: can I buy Tidal wave decals from you using a money order? I don’t do credit cards and no nothing about pay pal but I wanted to buy some of your decals.
Hi Chris
I’ve sent you an email in response to this question.
Dave